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Abstract
The Marshall Decision has had a significant impact on fisheries policy in Atlantic
Canada. The Governmen t of Canada through its Department of Fisheries and Oceans has
negotiated agreements with most of the Mi 'kmaq and Malecit e First Nations affected by
this decision. The federa l government has provided funding to pay for a voluntary buy-
back program for fishing licences. gear and to prov ide trainin g for aboriginal
communi ties . Non-aboriginals negat ively impacted by the Marshall Decision have
received no compensation and feel that their needs and concerns are being ignored . Most
aboriginal commu nities feci the Marsha ll Decision represe nts new opportunities for
employment and training and the opportunity to build and foster pride in themselv es and
their heritage. The Marshall Decision may also lay the groundwork for negotiations with
the federal and provincial governments to provide access to other industries and
resources . The governmen t still needs to ensure that long tenn traini ng in the industry is
available for all. that compensation is given to those forced to leave the industry and
greater consu ltation is initiated with all affected groups. Unfortunately. the fishery is still
a volat ile industry. lf resources or markets decl ine, there is no easy solution to insure that
aboriginals and non-abo riginals maintain the right to eam a modera te livelihood from the
fishing industry.
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1.0 Introduction
On the 1t h of September, 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada overt urned the conviction
of Donald Marshall, Jr., thereby reaffinn ing the rights of the 34 Mi'kmaq and Malcci te
First Nations in the Maritimes and the Gaspe regio n of Quebec to fish commerc ially , This
right was not all encompassing but it did give the provision that aborigina ls could fish
commercially for the purposes of earn ing a "moderate living", With this decision, the
face of fisheries management and fisheries policy changed in Atlantic Canada. The
Government of Canada was slow to react. This lack of an action plan result ed in criticism
from aboriginals and non-aborig inals alike . More importantl y though was the basic fact
that aboriginals felt that their rights had finally been recognized,
The rights of aboriginals in Canada can be divided into two categories; aboriginal right s
and treaty rights (Reiter, 2000 ). Aboriginal rights refer to the practices, customs and
tradition s of aboriginals before contact with Europeans (Allain, 1996b). Treaty right s are
defined as rights that were formally agreed to by the aborigi nal group and the Crown.
Both aboriginal and treaty rights are affirmed in Section 35 of the Constitution Act of
1982 (Reiter, 2000 ). In the case of R. v. Marsha ll, the defence successfu lly argued that
the Mi'kmaq and Malecite had negotiated a treaty right, an agreement with the British
Crow n, to fish commercially , To fully understand the Supreme Court's ruling, this paper
will first examine key documents that were fundame ntal to Donald Marsha ll, Jr.' s
successful defenc e. The Treaties of 1760-61, the Royal Proclamat ion and the Canadian
Constitution Act of 1982 all provide important information. Several court cases also
provide importan t backgro und information. While the documenls and cases discussed arc
not all encompassing, they do provide sufficient background information to allow for an
undemanding of the struggl es ofaboriginals since the arrival of Europcan settl ers. It also
provides the bas is of what Canada 's responsib ilities arc as a nation to ensure that
aboriginal and negot iated treat y rights are recogn ized. respec ted and protected . Thi s
backgro und info rmatio n provides a greater unders tand ing of the Marshall Deci sion itsel f.
When examining the impact of the Marshall Dec isio n on fisheries policy in Atlanti e
Canada it is import ant to know the players involved, what were the oppos ing viewpo ints
ofthe interested part ies in the case and what was the Supreme Court 's ruling in what has
bee n now dubbed as Mars hall No . I. The clari fication of the Marshall Decision issued in
Marshall NO.2 is also examined.
The importance ofthc Marshal l Decision in directing fisheri es policy can be seen when
we analyze what this decision means to the different groups that have been affected . The
role and responsibilities of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans are studied and the
impact of the Marshall Decisio n on current government po licy is invest igated . The
Marshall Deci sion also impac ts bot h aborigina l and non-aboriginal communities . The
issues faced by these communities as a resu lt of the governmen t 's changes in the fisheries
policy are very different. While this report can not possi bly co ver all of the potentia l
proble ms. many of the major issues are addressed . Fina lly, the potentia l for the impact of
the Marsh all Decision to extend beyond the abori gina l gro ups and the natural reso urces
that are spec ifica lly referred 10 in this Supreme Co urt case is examined.
2.0 Background
2.1 The Treaties of1760 and 1761
The "Peace and Friendship Treaties" consist ofthirteen agreements negotiated between
1693 and 1779 between the British authorities and the aborig inal groups who primarily
resided along the Northeas t Coast of North America (O' Donnell, 1989). Native fishing
rights are specifica lly mentioned in five of these agreements (O 'Donnell. 1989). Some
historians argue that these treaties arc simply surrender agreements made by aboriginals
with the British in exchange for peace and such things as the release of prisoners. The
British were powerful and the aboriginal leaders were in no position to negotiate
favourab le terms for their people. The opposing argument states that the British and
aborig ina l groups were equals. The treaties represen t the continued effo rt put forward by
both sidcs to live and co-exist in a mutually beneficial manner. The Malecit e and
Mi'kmaq peoples were sovere ign nations in their own right. Surrendering tit le and
jurisdiction of their lands to the British Crown wou ld be unthinkable (Coates, 2000,
p.34). A lack of effective communicat ion ski lls between the two nations is often cited for
the lack of consensus between the groups as to the actual scope o f the agreemen t that was
signed.
Historically, the aboriginal groups tended to side with the French colonists but they
negotiated agreements with the Brit ish. The British Crown wanted to publicly show their
commitment to peace with the Indian nations. This was partly achieved through the
iss uance of "The Proclamation of 1761". It stated that the colonial governme nts must
respect Indian land rights. In 1761, the Mi'kmaq signed a treaty with the British
authori ties, there by making peace with the Britain and reaffirm ing past treat ies. This was
important as the British wanted to ensure that the Indian nations maintained the peace
with the numerous British colonies.
What is interes ting to note about the Treaties of 1760 and 1761 is that these is no me ntion
of a treaty right to hunt or fish in the formal doc uments . Yet, these treat ies served as the
basis for the defence in R. v, Marshall (Hurlburt, 2(00). Thc British did agree to estab lish
trading posts or truc k houses. It can therefore be argued that ifthcrc was an agree ment to
establish tradi ng posts, than the Malecite and Mi'kmaq must have had a righ t to co llect
commodities (thro ugh hunting and fishing) to trade for goods, such as ammunition, from
the British . The argume nt in the Marshall decis ion is not that the spec ific treaties of 1760
and 176 1 apply to Donald Marshall. The argument presented focused on the terms
surrounding the treaties that should be acknowledged and app lied to the case .
2.2 The Royal Proclamation of1763
The Roya l Proclamation of 1763 was issued by representatives of the British Crown to
address a number of issues. The British had recently won the Seven Years war with
France . Winning that war gave the Britis h the opportunity to claim domin ion ove r the
New World. This could only be achieved if British Law preva iled in the new colonies.
There was still a threat to British dominance from the spread ing Russian occupation in
the North and the Spanish presence in the south-wes t. The British had 10 gain the
cooperation and trust of aboriginal nations, many of whom had fough t for the French in
the Seven Year War. It is important to remember that maintaining good relation s with the
native people was important to the British Crown. The Crown had as its policy in settling
inhabited lands that aboriginal or Indian title must be recogni zed and respected (Alla in,
1996b ). This policy was driven by doctrine of conquest in the Memorandum to the Privy
Council, 1722, stating that the crown had to recognize the existence of individua l nations
and treat them as equa ls (Culhan e, 1998).
Public polic y in Britain was not necessarily pract iced by colonial governments. During
the Seven Year war with France, promises of generous returns for furs and other goods
had been made by the British with several Indian nations in an effort to make allies
during the war with the French. After the war, funding to the colonies had been greatly
reduced making it difficult or impossible for British official s to meet their obligations
with the Indian nations. Failure of British officiaJs to meet their promises to the Indians
increased the likelihood that the Indians would trade with the richer settle rs. Overal l,
respect for Indian title to land and basic rights was often ignored . This led to conflicts and
rebellions by the Indian nation s. The rebellion in 1763, often known as Pontiac 's Rising
(Cullhane , 1998), led the colonial government to real ize that the issue of Indian title to
land had to be addr essed. More imponantly, the Crown and the co lonial governments
were probabl y looking out for their own self interests and realized the nece ssity to act
quickl y.
There are man y factors to consider when examin ing the Proclamation . As the number of
Briti sh settlers in Que bec was relativel y low in compari son to Frenc h, the Brit ish saw the
vast area of Quebec as a good area to try and attract immigrati on from settlers of the
increas ing ly crowded New England colonies. In order for this to occu r, the Briti sh had to
ensure that tension s between Indians over land ownership and use remain ed low. Britain
wanted to gain control over the laws and systems of the New World. To further enhance
their control, one of the Crown's objectives was to gain a monopoly on trad e with the
Indian s (Culhan e, 1998).
The Royal Proclama tion of 1763 stated that it would be the practic e of the Briti sh
colonies that they would obtain land cessions from the Indians prior to settl ing an area.
The preamb le stated that the aborigina ls living within the territo ries cla imed by the
Crown wou ld be protected. It also stated that rights to the use of thei r hunt ing grounds
would be prot ected in areas that the aboriginals had not formally ceded to the colonies.
The wording of the Proclamation is vague. It has been argued that it was onl y intended to
apply 10 Indian nations west ofthe Appalach ian Mountain s. In the legal arena it has been
successfu lly argued that it appli es to Canada 's Maritimes as we ll (O 'Do nnell, 1989).
The re is no mention of fishing right s in the Royal Proclamation however the eourt s have
ruled that the refe rence to huntin g grounds is taken to include fishin g right s as well
(O 'D onnell , 1989).
2.3 11le Canadian Cons nnaion Act of1981.
Prior to the Constitution Act of 1982, the Supreme Coun rarely addressed the concept of
abo riginal rights, giving little or no direction to the lower courts. In the majori ty of cases,
abo riginal rights were ignored. Cases where abori ginal and/or trea ty rights were used as a
defence typically ended in failure. While som e jud ges did sympathize with the plight of
the aboriginals, there always appeared to be some reaso n for the decisi on not to support
the abo rigina ls claim [Sharm a, 1998). In addition, gove rnmen t law often neg lected
aboriginal and trea ty rights . Th rough history the courts routinely supported governmen t
laws that failed to recognize any previously negotiated treaty rights.
The on e exception to this genera l role was Sectio n 88 of the Indian Act. It contains a
specifi c re ference to aborigi nal treaty rights which stales:
"88. Subject to ,he terms ofany treaty and any other Act ofParlia ment . all laws
ofgeneral applica uon for time to time in force ill allY provin ce are applicable to
and in respec t oflnJiaTU in Ihe province... ••(Indian Act. 1985).
Whil e this proved useful in pro tecting aboriginal treaty rights from confli cting provincial
law, it did not protect these same rights from similar contrad ictions found in federal laws
[Wild smith, 1995). Federal law had the power to extinguish aboriginal and treat y right s
(Allain. 1996h ).
This changed on Apri1 171h, 1982 when the Constitution Act of 1982 was rati fied. Section
35 of the Canad ian Constit ution recognizes and affirms existing aborigina l and treat y
rights. Aboriginal rights cannot be claimed ifboth the aborigi nals and non-aboriginals
had previously extinguished these rights in a treaty that had been entered into freely by
both parties . In add ition, the government can limit these rights if it can prove tha t there is
ajust reason or cause for the limitation. In the fishing industry , the most valid argument
for limits on a con firmed right is conse rvation (Reiter , 2000) .
A large body of case law relating to aborigina l and treaty rights has been created based on
the Constitution Act of 1982 (Allain, 1996b). While Section 35 recogni zed and affi rmed
aboriginal and treaty rights, it did not define what these rights were . There has been much
debate over what these rights encompass and the extent to which it affects various issues.
The Mi 'kmaq and Malecite First Nations in the Maritime s signed treat ies with the British.
Therefore they believe, and the court has now ruled, that fishing rights are covered by
these treaties .
2.4 Cases Leading up to the Marshall Decision
The Peace and Friendship Treat ies in the Maritimes are unique . Treaties were o ften made
with Indians to extinguish rights. The Peace and Friends hip Treati es actuall y reaffirm the
right to hunt and fish that existed prior to any contact with the Europeans . It can be said
that in the Mariti mes, aboriginal and treaty rights coexist (Wildsmith, 1995).
Litigation of aboriginal and treaty rights has been common even before the Cons titution
Act of 1982. One of the first cases involving First Nations rights to fish in the Maritimes
can be found in R. vs. Simon (1959] 124 e.C.C. where a member of the Big Cove Band
Mi'kmaq Indians had been convicted for fisheries violations of the New Brunswic k
Fisheries Regu lations made under the Fisheries ACI(O'Donnell, 1989). The defence
slated that the appellant was not governed by these regulations under the Treaty of 1752
(one of the Peace and Friendship Treaties) that states, ..... .free liberty of Hunting and
Fishing as usual" (O' Donne ll, 1989). The appeal was lost. The reasons for the decision
was that the defence had made no attempt to make a connection between the group of
Indians with whom the treaty was made back in 1752 and the individual thathad been
charged. This judge ment was importan t because it recognized that treaties made with
aboriginal groups were legal documents and should be treated as such.
In British Columb ia, aborigi nal groups were faced with a differe nt situation. They had
never signed treaties with anyone surrendering their land, yet both provinc ial and federa l
legislation was enacted as if the Nisga's rights had never existed . In 1973, the Calder
decision brought these issues to the forefront. The Nisga had been trying to negotiate a
treaty with the Governme nt of Canada, recognizi ng the Nisga's ownersh ip of traditional
lands. The case was taken to the Supreme Court of Canada . In the end the decision was
split, three to three with the finaland deciding vote being decided on a technica lity. The
case was turned back and the Nisga lost. The group who had decided against the Nisga
held that their title to traditional lands had been extinguished by the Brit ish and Colonial
governments prior to British Columbia joi ning confedera tion. The group that voted in
favour of the Nisga felt that in the absence of a formal treaty agreem ent, the Nisga's
rights had never been forma lly extinguis hed (Coates, 2000 ; Allan, 1996b).
Legally, the Nisga had been defeated but a political and moral victory was claimed. The
Canadian Government at the time were surprised by the depth of public support for the
Nisga's cla im. Prime Minister Trudeau and Indian Affairs Minister Chretien started a
series of negotiations over land claims issues with those First Nations who had never
previously entered into a forma l treaty with the government. In April 2000, the Nisga's
agreement finally received Royal Assent [Nisga's Final Agreeme nt Act, 2000 ). While the
Calder decision applies to British Columbia, it was important in finally bringing the
plight of Aborigina l groups and their rights into the publ ic's view. Government was
forced to listen and pay attention to the aboriginal issues that had been virtually ignored
for over two centuries. Court litigated decisions were taking a more favourab le view
towards aborigi nal claims based on treaty rights. Aboriginal issues were being recognized
as a valid concern (Coa tes, 2000 ).
Section 35 of the Const itution Act of 1982 recognized and affirmed aboriginal and treaty
rights. In 1990, in the case of R. vs. Sparrow , the Supreme Court of Canada ruled on the
scope of Sect ion 35 of the Const itution Act of 1982 (Allan, 1996b; Borrows, 2001). Mr.
Ronald Sparrow, Jr. belonged to the Musqueam Indian Band . He was charg ed under the
Fisheries Act with fishing with an illegal net on the Fraser River in British Columbia.
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Mr. Sparrow never denied his actions or the dimensions of the net he used. Instead. the
defence in Mr. Sparrow's case argued that he had an aboriginal right to fish and that this
right was guaranteed under Section 35 of the Canadian Constitution. The provincial court
found Mr. Sparrow guilty as charged. Whe n appea led to the Britis h Colombia Court of
Appea l. the decision was overtu rned. The case was taken to the Supre me Co urt of
Cana da . With the case in the Supreme Court. the National Ind ian Brothcrhood intervened
in support ofSparrow. The B.C . Wildlife Federation. the Fisheries Co unc il of B.C.• the
United Fishennen and Allied wo rkers Union. and provincial governments of B.C..
Alberta. Saska tchewan. Ontario. Quebec and Newfoundland all gave thei r support to the
Crown's argu ments (Sharma, 1998) .
In a historical and monumental dec is ion, the Supreme Court of Canada stated tha t the
aboriginal right 10 fish for food and ceremonia l purposes was protected under the
Canadi an Constitution. II further stated that this right to fish came ahea d of the needs of
any other group . includ ing thc commercial and sport fish ing indus tries. This right could
be regu lated but the regu lation must only be for a va lid reason. such as co nservation. In
addition. the on us is on the state to prove that this regulation is jus tified and any
regulation of aborig ina l fish ing righ ts for food must be done in consultation wi th the
abori ginal group affected {Sharma, 1998).
Fo llowing the Sparrow Decision. the courts have had the tendency to give a broad
interpret at ion to Section 35 of the Co nst itution . In 1990. the Appeal Division of the Nova
I I
Scotia Supreme Court of ruled in the case of three Mi 'kmaq men. Denny . Paul and
Syliboy, charged with a variety of fisheries offences. The court stated that the men had
"an aboriginal right to fish for food in the waters in question" (Coates, 200 0). The court.
as in the Sparro w case , ruled that this right stood only behind the need for conservation.
Another examp le of this can be found in the case of Delgamuuk w in 199 7. In this case,
the land rights of the Gitskan and wer'suwet'e n First Nat ions in north- central British
Co lombia and the owners hip and use of reso urces on the lands in questio n wer e the
subject of deb ate. Again the case travelled thro ugh the court system, ending in the
Supreme Cou rt of Canada. The Supreme Court overturned the earlie r decisions of the
lower courts and ord ered a new trial. It should be noted. that in its j udgement in the
Delgamuu kw case, the Supreme Court made many statements that were bo th far-reaching
and in some ways, uncl ear. An import ant ruling for the First Nations was that oral
testimony and oral traditions of First Nat ions shou ld be admi ssible in the courts as
evidence and be given signific ant atten tion when dec iding cases involving aboriginal s.
The Supre me Court a lso recogn ized the rights of aboriginals to harv est traditional
resources and even indicated that it would be expected that the way in which these
harvest occ urred would evo lve as non-aboriginal fisheri es has evolved. It went further to
sta te that these rights are prot ected under Section 35 of the Canadian Cons titution
(Culhane . 1998; Coates. 2000 ). The Supreme Court did place a burden of proo f on First
Nations. It stated that the use of the resources ofthe land by First Na tions could not be
done in such a way as to ob literate the relationship that First Nations have had with the
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land since time immemorial. First Nations , in claiming land and rights were left with the
burden of proof that they hadexclusive and continuous use and occupancy of a land or
territory . Another notab le statement by the Supreme Court was the requirement that the
Crown negot iate in "good faith" with First Nations over territori al and resourc e rights. In
the end, a negotiated decision is more beneficial to all parties involved than a litigated
decision (Coates, 2(H)().
3,0 The Marshall Decision
3.J The Case ofR. v. Marshall
No one imagined, includi ng the aborigina l communi ty, that the Supreme Court's decis ion
on Septem ber 17th, 1999, in the case ofR. v. Marshall, would have such depth and scope
for abori ginal treaty rights. In August of 1993, Donald Marshall Jr. and a companion
were charged with both fishing and selling eels without a licence. These activities were
conducted during a closed season using illegal nets. They had caught 463 pounds of eels
and sold them for a price of$787.10 (Coates , 2000; Rotman, 2(H)(). Marshall 's claim in
his defence was that he had a treaty right to fish and sell eels. Marsha ll was defended by
Mr. Bruce Wildsmith, who was the senior legal counci l for the Union of Nova Scotia
Indians and a law professo r at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia. Mr.
Wildsmith had a history of defending aboriginal issues , especia lly those involving the use
of natural resources by First Nations. The Marshall case was initia lly built on the Treaty
of 1752, however, the focus shifted to the Treaties of 1760-1761 with specific reference
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to the "truc k house clause" (Rotman, 2000). Prio r to this. the Sparro w decision had
estab lished an abo riginal righ t to catch fish for food and ceremonial purposes (Allan ,
1996b ; Borrows. 2001). Now theco urt was also being asked 10 decid e if the Mi'kmaq
and Malecit e ofthe Mari times had also negotiated a trea ty right to se ll the fish they
caugh t, thus partic ipat ing in an ecuve way in a commercial fishery .
In the firs t hearin g of the case, Marshall was con vic ted as charged . The:decision was
brought down in June of 1996 by Judge John Embree. Whi le he ruled that the:trea ties of
1760 and 1761 were valid. truck houses and Indian Trading Age nts no longe r existed . As
th is was the on ly wa y Ihat the treat y a llowed the Mi'kmaq to parti c ipate in com mercial
acti vities such as sellin g of fish, he ru led that the right 10 se ll fish commerc ially no longer
ex isted (Coates, 2000 ). As was expected, the case was appealed to the Nova Scoti a Co urt
of Appeal and was heard in February, 1997. Once again, Marshall ' s co nvicti on was
upheld . Marshall 's defence had argued that the Mi 'kmaq hadsuccessfully negotiated
their continued right to fish commercially throu gh the Treat ies o f 1760-6 1. Onc e agai n
thecou rt d isagreed with this stand . The right to trad e at truck houses was seen as a means
to an end. By agreei ng to th is st ipula tion, the Brit ish crown was ensuring that they wou ld
quickly sec ure a treat y with the Mi'kmaq. There was no inten tion o r guarantee that the
right to fish commercially was exp ected to last forever (Coat es , 2000).
As was expected from the very beginning of the process, the case was appealed to the
Supreme Court of Canad a. The lawyers started to present thei r appeals in November,
14
1998. This court case now had 'lay high stakes attached and as such. there were
intervent ions from outsi de groups for both sides. Groups such as the:New Brunswick
Government were concerned with the implications of a favourab le decision for Marshall
on other resources . The West Nova Fishermen 's Coalition was concern ed with the impact
and implicatio ns of an expanded abori ginal fishery on non-abori ginals alread y emp loyed
in a volatile industry. The Union of New Brunswick Indians interven ed in support o f
Marshall and the promise of a new possibility for employmen t (Coates, 2000) .
The arguments in the appea l process could only depend on evidence and testimony
presen ted previously. Marshall' s lawyer kept his defence simple. Marshall had a treaty
right to catch and sell fish. An aboriginal fishery could be regulated but only with sound
and reasonable explanations from the governmen t; aboriginal rights to the resource had to
be acknow ledged . Marshall 's defence can best bedescribed as follows :
"The crux of the claim lies in the restrictive covenant contained withi n the
1760 document, which reads in part, .. .we will not traffick, barter or
exchange any commod ities in any manner but with such persons or the
manager of such Truck houses as shall be appointed or Establis hed by His
Majesty's Governor at Lunenbourg or elsewhere in Nova Scotia or
Acadia . (Isaac and Drummie, 2(00)."
IS
The Supreme Court deliberated for approximately ten months. In the end, the decision
that would later be dubbed Marshall No. I was handed down with a majo rity of Supreme
Court justices supporting Marshall. The Supreme Court ruled that "the Mi' kmaq have a
constitutionally protected right to fish for "n ecessaries" which is rooted in solemn mutual
promises exchanged between the Mi'kmaq and the British Crown during the 18th
century." (Sheffer, 2000). The right to fish commercially was limited to the ability for
aboriginals to earn a "m oderate livelihood" and did not extend to the "open-ended
accumulation of wealth" (Rotman, 2000). The Court also stated that these treaty rights
were limited to the area where the Mi'kmaq traditionally lived and that these rights were
a community right as apposed to an individual right (Isaac, 2000).
The Marsha ll Decision took everyone by surprise. Most notably was the Federal
Government, specifica lly the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, who had no plan of
action that would help keep the fishing industry in the Maritimes on an "even keel", Even
as the Marshall Case entered the Supreme Court, the Federal Government failed to even
consider what would happen and their course of action if Donald Marshall Jr . won his
case. A writer for The Navigator criticized the government' s lawyers for failing to ask the
Supreme Court for a "cooling off period" 10 allow time for interpreting and implementing
the Supreme Courts decision (Wadman, 1999).
While the Supreme Court rarely took this type of action. precedent had been set in other
Supreme Court Cases.For example. in the 1997 Supreme Court Decision in Eldridge v.
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Brit ish Co lumbia (Attorney General) , the Supreme Court decided in favour of Robin
Susan Eldridge, John Henry Warren and Linda Jane Warren . These appellants were all
born deaf. Their lawyers successfully argued that the Medical Serv ices Plan failure to
provide for sign language interpreters (sign language being the ir preferred method of
communication) violated their s. 15(1) rights of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. Whi le the Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the appellants and ruled in
their favour, they suspended the effectiv eness of the declaration for six months . That
would allow sufficient time for the Britis h Co lumbia government to implement a suitab le
and effective plan to deal with this situation (Eldridge v. Britis h Col umbia, 1997).
Anot her examp le is in the ruling regardin g Manitoba 's Language Rights . In this case , the
Acts of the Manitoba Leg islature were ruled to be inva lid and have no lega l forcebecause
they wer e not written and printed in both English and French . Howe ver, the absence of
laws would result in lega l chaos. Therefore, the Supreme Court tempora rily dec lared the
laws valid for the minimum time that would be required for translation, re-enactment,
printing and publishi ng. This only applied to laws enacted prior to the rul ing. Any new
laws were required to be issued in both official languages (Re Manitoba Language
Rights, 1985). If the Supreme Court found in favour of Mars hall, which they did, there
wou ld have to be wide sweeping changes in the government's polic y that wou ld have a
significant impact on fishers in Atlantic Canada. If the Supreme Court hadbeen asked,
and had granted, a time period in which to imp lement these changes, maybe some of the
violent standoffs and confrontations cou ld have been avoided. The bottom line however
17
is that given the curre nt cli mate in the Supre me Court regarding cases invo lving
abo riginal rights the governm ent shou ld have been prepared for the Mars hall decision.
Reactions to the Marshall decision were strong on both sides of the spect rum, with a lot
of animosity, fuelled by the unkno wn, between the two sides . The aborigi nal com munity
celebrated a huge victory. In the Mariti mes and Quebec there were 34 band s that
interpre ted the Mars hall Decisio n as giving them all the rights and privileges to fish
lobster without regulation by the federal government. This would be a trem endous
econ omic boost to a group that were plagued by high unemp loyment rates . They
proceeded to begin fishing durin g a season closed to non -abo riginal fishers. At the same
time, non -aborigina ls were voicing their concerns to the federa l government that the
lucrat ive lobster fishing grounds and stocks would be destroyed . They called for the
government to put a stop to the fishing immediately (Wood, 20ooa ). The lobster fishery is
a multi-million do llar industry and the West Nova Fishermen's Coalit ion and others in
the indust ry were obv iously concerned about how an increased aborig inal presence in the
fishe ry would affe ct them .
The West Nova Fishe rman 's Coalitio n reques ted that a stay of judgement be issued and a
rehearing ordered. The Sup reme Court turned dow n this and all othe r req uests to have the
case reope ned or the judgement se t aside . Instead, the Supreme Court prefo rmed an
unusua l act; in November of 1999 the y issued a clarification of their decision. In that
clarification they stated that thei r ruli ng covered a narrow area . It on ly app lied 10 those
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items, fish, wildlife and berries, that had been gathered traditionally. The court had not
ruled, nor was it asked to rule, on whether this treaty right extended to natural resources
and industries that are considered of value today, such as timber, mineral resources and
ofT-shore oil and natural gas. It also stated that the treaty right to fish was still subject to
regulation by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. These regulations must be
justifiable but could be imposed for such reasons as conservation or other substantial
public purposes. These purposes included economic and regional fairness or reoognition
oft he historical reliance of non-aboriginal groups on the fishery (Backgrounder, 2001).
As is the situation in manycourt cases involving native and treaty rights, the Supreme
Court urged both parties to search for solutions to these issues through negotiation rather
than litigation.
4.0 An Analysis of the Marshall Decision
The Supreme Court decided in the case ofR . v. Marshall that the Treaties of 1760-61 did
provide a treaty right to fish to earn a "moderate livelihood". A definition ofa "moderate
livelihood" was not provided by the Supreme Court and for the purposes of this report, it
wasn't necessary. For aboriginal communities to be allowed to earn a "moderate
livelihood" in the fishery in Atlantic Canada, changes in the allocations of licences and
quotas in the different fisheries would have 10 be made. The Department of Fisheries and
Oceans were now required by the courts to provide commercial fisheries access to the
Mi'kmaq and Malecite communities of Atlantic Canada. They were also responsible for
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ensuring that the fisheries resources were maintained at accep table levels to maintain a
sustainable harvest in perpetuity. In order to accomplish these goals, changes would have
to be made in fisheries policy for Atlant ic Canada . The impact of these changes is very
differe nt for aborigina l and non-aborigin al groups. The federal governme nt must institute
these changes and at the same time deal with the many social issues that resu lt.
The Marshall Decision has been described as:
.... ..another example of the Supreme Court attempting to balance
Aboriginal and treaty rights with the rights of other Canadians, including
the authori ty of governments to regulate the expression ofthose rights
within justified limits."(Isaac, 20(0 ).
This is a fair assessm ent of the problems and duties the Supreme Court faces when asked
to litigate decis ions of this nature. More important ly are the questions of"How will the
federal governme nt's fisheries policy change?" , and " What will be the impact on both
aboriginal and non-aboriginal peoples and comm unities and their way of life?".
4.1 The Department ofFisheries and Oceans
In cases such as R. v. Marshall, the policy and laws ofthe federa l governmen t are
directed by the litigation of a Supreme Court of Canada ease. The Minister of the
Department of Fisheries and Oceans has contro l and responsibility of fisheries policy . In
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this situation, the federal government must ensure that when making decisions regardin g
fisheries policy and law they adhere to the Supreme Court ruling. For example, as a result
of the Supreme Courts decision in R. v. Marshall the allocation of licence s and quotas in
the fisheries of Atlant ic Canada must include Mi 'kmaq and Malecite communities and
provide a "moderate livelihood " for these groups.
It is important to remembe r that the Marshall decision did not take away the federal
government 's right to regulate the fishery. Part of the federal government 's responsib ility
is to ensure that all aspects of the fishery, including conservation and econom ic viability
are taken care of. This point was re-iterated in February, 2002, when the Supreme Court
of Canada handed down its decision in the case of Ward v. Can ada. This case provides an
excellent example of what the Supreme Court feels is the extent of the responsibility of
the federal government over Canada's fishing industry . Ford Ward did have a
commercia l sealing licence that allowed him to harvest hooded and harp seals. Among
the 50 sea ls that he had harvested, a number of hooded blueback sea ls were found. Under
Section 27 of the Marine Mamma ls Regulations the sale, trade or barterofwhitecoats
(young harp seals) or blueback s (young hooded seals) is prohibited . Therefore , Ward was
charged under Section 27 of the Marine Mammals Regulat ions. Ward made a
constitutional challenge to the Supreme Court statin g that Section 27 was ultra vires the
Parliament of Canada. Wards challenge was lost. In this case, as in the case ofR. v,
Marshal l, the Supreme Court of Canada has said that the Department of Fishcries and
Oceans is not only responsible for the conservation of fish stocks. They are also
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responsib le for the "m aintenance and preservation of the fishery as a whole , including its
econo mic value." (Ward v, Canada, 2002) . This once again reaffi rms the Supreme
Court 's stand in Marshall that the Departm ent of Fisheries and Oce ans' right to regulate a
fishery can be for the eco nomic good of all.
The biggest criticism of the Fede ral Governm ent when the Supreme Court handed down
its decision in September of 1999 was that it had no actio n plan in place to deal with the a
Suprem e Court ruling in favo ur of Marsha ll. There had been no thought as to how the
federa l governm ent wo uld execu te its respons ibilities if Mars ha ll won his appeal. As a
resu lt, chaos erup ted. In the November 1999 edition of The Naviga tor, one headline read
"Ot tawa fiddles, fishery bums" (Wadman , 1999). The lack of gove rnme nt planning and
action was being blamed for increased tensions between abo riginal and non-abori gin al
fishers, the destructio n of gear and a generally vola tile atmosp here in the region
(Wadman, 1999). In the wee ks directl y following the decis ion, the Minister of Fishcries
made numero us stateme nts (September 20, October I , and Octo ber 10, 1999) and
released letters (September 27, 1999) ca lling for calm and ask ing for time. Despite the
fact that the Supreme Court had deliberated for over ten mo nths to reach a decision, the
federal government now needed more time to fully understan d the ruling and its
implicatio ns. They also needed time to devise an action plan for implementing the
changes requ ired by the Supreme Co urts decision . With the exceptions ofBumt Churc h
and Indian Brook , First Nations affec ted by the Marshall decis ion agre ed to a self
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imposed moratorium on fishing to give the governm ent time to negotiate interim
agreements.
Many issues had to be consi dered when the government beg an to devi se thei r plan to
bring aboriginal peo ple into the commercial fishery . One o f the mo st important issues is
that commerciall y exploit ed fish stocks are cons idered a renew able reso urce, if they are
managed prop erly. However, most commercia lly exploited spec ies in Atlantic Canad a
were already being harvested at the maximum allowable levels. The federal governm ent
was given the respon sibilities of makin g fishing licences available to abori ginal
communities, while continuing to maintain the fish stocks at acceptable leve ls. Devising a
suitable actio n plan was further complicated by the federal gove rnment's respo nsibility 10
ensure that the econo mic good of the eon-abo riginal peop les and comm unities who had a
historic tie to the fishery was maintained . Displacement of one gro up or co mm unity at the
expense to ano ther group would not be seen favo urably. Fishing is the main, and in som e
cases only , indus try in the area. Witho ut the fishing industry as a source of em ployment.,
people, especially the younger workers of the area, wou ld hav e to relocate to find jobs,
When formu lating an action plan, the governme nt also had to cons ider the close
prox imity of the abori ginal and non-abori ginal communiti es in these rural areas.
Interference by the government with a person ' s ability to eam their livelihood in a
manner they are accustomed wou ld result in intense, emo tional reactions . The se peo ple
were neighbours. The social conseq uences of manda tory relinquishment of fishing
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licences would have severe consequences, includ ing the possibility ofhuman tragedy. In
addition, but much less important, is that pol itically, this move would have been suicidal.
Given this situation, the only plausible way to allow for new participation in a fishery
already ut ilized to its maximum was to obtain the necessary number of licences required
thro ugh a voluntary "buy hack - program.
In February, 2000 the government declared that to acco mp lish its goa l of expanding the
native lobst er fishery , it would buy back greater that 1000 commercial fishing licences,
includ ing boat s and gear ("Statement" , 2000) . Those person s who wis hed to leave the
fishery or reti re would begive n the oppo rtunity to se ll thei r licences and their gear bac k
to the government for considerable pro fit. When the federa l budget came down during
the same month, SI60 millio n had been allocated for use by the Department of Fishcrics
and Oceans to deal with the Marshall Decision (Wood, 2000b; Backgrounder, 2001). The
money wou ld be used for the purchase of licenses and other projects, including training.
which would be aimed at bringing the aboriginal groups into thefishery .
It took longer to reac h negot iated interi m set tlements than expected but by Augus t, 2000,
27 abo rigina l bands had signed agreements. On ly Burn t Ch urch and Ind ian Brook refused
to sign (Wood, 2000b ). The gove rnm ent has worked stead ily since that time to negotiate
dea ls in the long te rm. The agreements have been negotiated based on the size ofthe
aborigi nal gro up and that gro ups wants and need s. Some agree ments have prov ided for
boats, gear and tra ining . In addition, the Departm ent of Fisheries and Oc eans fisheries
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po licy has also al lowed abo rigina l communities 10 d iversi fy into o ther sectors relating 10
fisheries such as aquaculture and ecotourism (Department of'Ftsheries and Oceans.
200 la). Such agreements will allow for a greater range of opportunities for the aboriginal
communities.
The governm ent has instit uted another review process that incl udes abori ginal fish ing
iss ues but its goals are to provide a method for the long-term development of pol icy and
decision mak ing processes. The Department of Fisheries and Oceans was direc ted by the
Minister to do an Atlanti c Fisheri es Po licy Review . Th is d irec tive, which cam e prior to
the Marshall Decision , was aimed at provid ing a thorough look at current fisheri es
pol icies, de termin e where prioriti es within the region were in co mpeti tion and clarify the
department's priorities and objectives. From this review. the dep artment's goal was to
deve lop and commit to a long-term fisheries management plan (Dep artment ofFishcries
and Oceans. 200lb). Part of this plan would have to deal with aboriginal fisheries and
treaty rights. It was obvious from the public consultations that fishing communities
consi der themselves to be stakeholders in the fishing industry and as such wan t to play an
active role in fisheri es management (Dep artm ent of Fisheri es and Oceans. 200l e). The
rea lityof thc prese nt sit uation is that when markets for fish are good and quotas provide
sufficient land ings to allow fishers to earn a good living, fishers and their com munities
arc happy . Proble ms ari se when stocks become dep icted and markets co llapse. The fina l
repo rt on the Atlantic Fisheries Policy Review has yet to be re leased. Therefo re, it was
beyon d the scope o f this repo rt to spec ulate abou t the Department o f Fisheri es and
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Oceans recommendations for its long-term policy initiatives. Ultimately, all fishers in
Atlantic Canada want a sustainable, viab le, renewable fishing industry . Only time will
tell if this is an achievab le goal.
Throughout the Department of Fisheries and Oceans' continued negotiations with the
First Nation communities and the Atlantic Fisheries Polic y Review public consultations,
the department has maintained the regulation of the fisheries. When communities such as
Burnt Church failed to reach a settlement, quotas and regulations have been set.
Violations of these regulations have resulted in the seizure of boats and gear. The federa l
government has spent large sums of money for enforceme nt and control of the fishery in
Atlantic Canada and especia lly in the Burnt ChurchlM iramichi Bay area since the
Marsha ll Decision. The federal government has maintained its right to contro l the
fisheries in Atlantic Canada for the good of all Cana dians.
4.1 Non-aboriginal communities in Atlant ic Canada
The Marshall Decision helped a nation focus on the hardships of the aborigi nal
communities in Atlantic Canada . It forced government to change their policy with respect
to who is involved in the fishery, how licences and quotas are allocated and how and
where funding is spent. The resultin g changes have caused great concern for non-
aborig inal fishers who have earned a livelihood from working in the industry. A lack of
knowledge and a fear of the unknown can cause people to react in ways that are
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uncharacteristi c. In the early days follow ing the Marshall Deci sion there was much ta lk
of racism against abori ginal s coming to the surface in the Maritimes. Thi s is a falsel y
held opi nion . In mo st cases, over 50 percent of the sed iment ex pressed by callers to
regional CBC radio-talk show s was in favour of extending abori ginal right s (Coates,
2000 ). Even fishers have acknowledged that the abori ginal co mmunities dese rve and
have a right to part icipat e in the fishery . An excellent example of the willin gness of non -
abori ginaIs to work with the aborigi nal communities was in Area 35 of the commereial
lobster fishery . The commerc ial fisherm an of this area and the Annapolis First Nation
worked out a community-based coo pera tive solution which enabled the co mmercial
lobster fishery to go ahead in the SOUlh West Nova in the fall of 1999 ("Statement",
1999c).
As stale d previously, the fede ral governmen t had set aside $160 million in its Feb ruary ,
2000 budg et to pay for agreements and initiati ves that allowed aboriginal communities to
part icipa te in the fishing and o ther relat ed indu stri es (Wood , 2000 b). Mu ch of these funds
went to buy hack licences from fishers looking to leave the fishery . There has been litt le
discussion howeve r of how these programs will affect the tradit ional non-aboriginal
fishing communities. The fishery is part of a tradi tional way of life. Th ese communities
and their economic viability have been traditionall y tied to the fishin g industry. When
there is a successful fish ing season, the commun ity prospers . If there is a poo r year in the
fisher y, the effec ts are fel t in the community. Th e question then becomes, what happens
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if a large port ion of fish ing licences are removed from a community or area whose
existenc e is linked to the fishing industry?
This is by no means a new prob lem faced by the rural oonununities whose existence has
been linked to the fishing industry. History demon strates that the governm ent has
repeatedl y introduced programs and legislation aimed at reduci ng or restricting capac ity.
The se measures were oftcn in response to changing condi tions in the fishery but the result
is the same . The moratorium that was imposed on the Northern codstocks in 1992
provides a recent exampl e. In Newfoundland alone over 700 oommunities were
dependent on the fishery. Over 12,000 fishermen and 15,000 plant work ers experienced
the loss of their empl oymen t and the source of their incom e in Newfoundland alone (Task
Force on Incom es and Adjustment in the Atlant ic Fishery , 1993) . In thi s case the
government introduced the Northern Cod Adjustme nt and Recovery Program (NCARP)
to pro vide fundin g for those affected . Under that program over 87 1 groundfi sh licences
were remo ved from the industry (Departm ent of Fisheries and Oceans, 200 1b). Under
The Atlant ic Groundfish Strate gy (TAGS), which was implemen ted with the ending of
the NCARP program , another 545 groundfi sh licences were retired (Departm ent of
Fisheries and Oceans, 200 1b). Based on these figure s, it was not surpri sing that
Newfoundland's popu lation dropped by 13,000 between 1993 and 1996 (H uman
Resources Developm ent Canada, 1998).
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In the current situation, fishermen who sold their licences and gear back to the
government were more than adequately compensated. Many of the fishers sellin g their
licences and leaving the industry were retiring. In an effort to ensure that enough licences
wou ld be made available voluntari ly, government paid extremely high prices for licences
and gear. The government was offerin g prices of between $300 ,000 to $350,000 for a
licence and fully equipped boat . The same licence and boat would have bee n sold for
$80,000 to S100,000 , five years ago (Augustine and Richard , 2(02). The government, in
an effort to secure fishing licences, had artificiall y inflated the price. Youn g crew
members wo uld not have the financial resources available to compete for licences at that
price . Crew members of lobster boats have said that it is now extremely difficu lt, if not
impossible, to save enough money to buy a licence. The on ly ones who can afford to pay
the high price of a licence today is Ottawa or a handful of sma ll companies that can still
afford them ("Nat ive fishery" , 2001) . Another point to con sider is that even if an ordinary
cit izen could finance the purchase of a fishing licence at this price , would it be
economica lly viab le? It is very likely that the cost of purchasing the licence at the
government inflated prices is so high that the purchaser coul d neve r make eno ugh mone y
fishing to pay for the cost of the licence and the gear.
There were also outcries from non-abo rigina l fishers that the licences bought back and
transferred to the aboriginal communities were not being utilized. One examp le cited a
traditio nal fishing community in north eastern New Brunswick where 21 crab fishermen
had lost their jobs. Some of the fishermen were in their 50 's making it extremely difficu lt
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for them to fmd alternat e emp loyment The captains who had previo usly em ployed them
had sold their boats andtheir licences had been transferred to the aboriginal communities,
A spokesman for the crab fishermen 's federa tion in the northern New Brunswick area
indicated that the quotas trans ferred were not being fished by aboriginals andthat boats
that were sold had not been used ("Native fishery", 200 1). Th e know ledg e tha t members
o f their community were unempl oyed and the quotas that the y use to fish were not being
utilized led to frustration and anger. In a report from the Miram ichi Bay Community
Relat ions Panel it was noted that boats that would have normall y been fishing were left
ancho red at overcrowded dock s because native fishers co uld not afford the gas to run
them (Augustine and Richard , 2002), Ano ther exa mple from the panel indicated that on ly
13 of 48 licences that had been bought from non-abo riginals for abo rigina ls were actually
being used as the nati ve comm unities lacked the know ledg e required to effectively utili ze
the licences (Augustine and Richard. 2002), The obvio us question becom es why shou ld
non-aboriginals be deni ed a right to earn a living when there are fishing quotas that are
not being fished ?
Fishing is a tradi tiona l industry, Therefore , licenc es were trad itionally pass ed through
gene ratio ns within a family, Sons ofte n went into the " family business" , Fishers who
were looking to retire from the fishery had a huge decision to make if they had family
who wished to take over their licence, As stated previou sly, the gove rnment was offering
betwee n $300,000 to S350,OOO for their licences and gear (Aug ustine and Richard , 2002),
Thi s wou ld be a good sum of money on which to retire and to share with the ir fami ly, In
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addit ion, they would probably never have the opportunity again to gain this level of profi t
from the sale of their fishing licences and gear. For the fishers that did decide to sell the
"family business" . the probability that their sons and/or daughte rs would remain in the
area were greally diminished. The sale of the licence back to the governme nt could bring
to the end a long standing tradition of a particular family residin g in the same com munity
over multiple genera tions.
Like many rura l communities, employment is often available in only one sector, in this
case fishing. If the source of employment is gone. there would be no reason for the young
unemployed crews or offsp ring of retired fishers to stay. This out migration could bring
the dea th of many of the rural business and communities whose survival was dependent
on the fishing industry . In one area where 44 boats and licences had been transferred to
First Nations com munities through the signing of one-year agreements , a coope rative that
has been around for close to a century had lost over $700,000 in the last year alone.
Fifteen people were no longer members and with them went 25% of its business . It has
been driven to bankruptcy (August ine and Richard, 2002 ).
Another issue facing displaced workers was their lack of training in other industries or
profess ions. The govern ment has made monies available for train ing of Firs t Nations
people entering the fishery but there was no re-tra ining mentione d for the workers that
the governme nt had displaced. Non-aboriginal fishers feel that in an effort to find a
speedy solution to the current crisis, government failed to recognize the needs of and the
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impact on non-aboriginals (August ine and Richard , 2002). The reaction by the
government to the Marshall Decision can be best described as a group running about ,
putting out little fires as they flare up. without an effective action plan on how to stop the
fires from happening or recurring .
Employment opport unities for persons whose only experience is in the fishing industry
are few. While the owners of the licences received more than adequa te compensation, the
crew that worked with the fisher on his vessel received no compensation. The younger
crew members lost their job s. There is the possibilit y that some of these workers could be
hired to train aborigina ls in navigation, the effective use oftoday' s fishing technology
and current fishing practices but this would not provide sufficient employment for all of
the crew members that have been displaced .
The government should acknowledge the impact their decision s have had on rural
communitie s in Atlantic Canada . Re-training should be offered to non-aborig inals to help
ease the trans ition. If people must leave their communities for alternate sources of
employment because of the government's polic y, then the governme nt shou ld be required
to help equip these people with the skill they need to eam a livelihood elsewhere. The
federal government adopted similar policies in the past with the initiation of the NCARP
and TAGS programs. In response to the collapse of groundfish stocks and the
displacement of thousands of workers, the government provided funding not only for
licence buy-back and retiremen t but also for training, relocation assistan ce and
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counselling (H uman Reso urces Developme nt Canada, 1998), The failure of the
government to plan in advance for the Marsha ll Decision has resulted in serio us holes
being lell in their fisheries policy.
As the Departme nt of Fisheries and Oceans seeks resolution to the problems it faces since
the Marsha ll Decision , non-aboriginals have accused the governme nt of seek ing the
speediest and easiest answers to their problems ; not the best solution for all parties
involved. Non-eborigina ls feel that the government has failed to keep them informed on,
and involved in the negotiation process with the aboriginal communities in their area.
This opinion has been specifica lly aimed at the negotiations with Burnt Church in the
Miramichi Bay area. Lobster is the most lucrative fishery in the area. One quote in the
recent report by the Miramich i Bay Community Relations Panel states that "Lobste r is
the only fishing that allows for a living."(Augustine and Richard , 2002) . In the area in
question, only spring fishing occurs . Over the years , fishers in the area have seen the
benefits of conservation, through education . By protecting the lobster at the time when
they are most vulnerable (in the fall) , the lobster stocks in the area have remained at
historica lly high levels. As a result, fishers continually reap the benefits of a lucrative
lobster fishery. If the government negotiates fall commercial fishing licences for lobsters
with the Burnt Church community, local fishers have charged that the governme nt has
failed to listen to their concerns, they could potentially damag e the lucrative lobster
stocks of the area and they would be ignoring the advice of science .
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When the issues facing non-aboriginal people and communi ties were considered. one
point became very appa rent; the Government of Canada, through the Depart ment of
Fisheries and Oceans cannot expect that fishery policy changes, aimed at helping
aborig inal communit ies. operate in a vacuum. These policies would also significan tly
impact the non-aboriginal people and communities ofthe same areas . That reality carries
the responsib ility outlined by the Supreme Court of Canada to the Department of
Fisheries and Oceans; manage the fishery for the good of all. This mandate required the
govemmenlto adopt a carefu l. unemotional and impartial decis ion making process. The
fisheries resource must be protected. Furthermore , these decisions should have a minima l
impact on the non-aboriginal fishers who chose to remain in the industry.
4.3 Abo riginal Communities in Atlantic Canada
The rights of thirty-four first nations in the Maritimes and the Gaspe regio n of Quebec
were reaffirmed by the Marshall Decision. Employme nt, industry training and education
and the social impacts ofthe decision were exam ined. It was also important to consider
the issues surrou nding the failure to reach negotiated settlements with some First Nations
groups. particu larly Burnt Church. Figure I prov ides a map of the area affected and the
location of the various First Nation communities.
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Figur e 1: A map of th e a rea and loution oh he First Nation liecmmu nmes impacted by t ileMar~hall
Deciliion (Department or nlih rrl es and (kuns, 2002).
4.3.1 Employment
For the abori ginal communities in Atlant ic Canada, the Marsha ll Decision marked
another step towards recognition of their treaty rights; treaty rights that had been ignored
for too long. Tbe opinions on the importance of the Marsha ll Decision to aborigina ls in
Atlantic Canada are varied. The clarifica tion of the Supreme Court's Decision in
November . 1999. was seen by man y aborigina ls as a slap in the face. The Supreme Court
stated that it "did not rule that the appellant had estab lished a treaty right to ' gather'
anything and everything capable ofbci ng gathered . The issues were much narrower and
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the ruling much narrower." (Coates, 2000) . The Supreme Court ruling determined that
the Treaties of 1760-61 gave aboriginals the right to harvest fish commercially. Whether
this decision is seen as a monumental step for aborig inals or aboriginals see this as the
Supreme Court bowing to the political pressure, the Mars hall Decision has provided
greater access for aboriginals to the fishery and it has forever chan ged fisherie s policy in
Atlantic Canada. The impact ofthese changes in fisheries policy on aboriginal peop les
and their communi ties are positive.
Increased employment opportunities are the most beneficial outcome of the Marshall
Decision. According to numbers released in the Government of Canada' s Backgrounder
The Marshall Judgement and the Federal Government 's Response (2001) , more that 220
fishing enterpri ses have been transferred to aboriginal communities. This translates into a
174% increase in the number of commercial lobster enterprises that are currently owned
and operated by aboriginal communities since the Marshall Decision. First Nations now
hold 10 tuna licences where they previously only held one and during the 2000 fishing
season in the southern GulfofSt. Lawrence and Sco tia Shelf, 7% of the crab quota was
allocated to aboriginal fishers. They also harvested 5% of the shrimp in Quebec
(Background er,200t).
Increased access to the fishery also means increased access to more that 520 seasonal
jobs directly in the industry, The government estimates that the landed value of the
catches from the increased participat ion will equal $2 1 million (Backgrounder , 2001).
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This can be convened to almost $14 million in earnings and pro fits for aboriginal
communities. These figures also translate into a decrease in unemployment in aboriginal
communities. The Minister of Fisheries and Oceans announced in a statement issued on
October 23,2001, that in theBig Cove First Nation several hundred people were now
emp loyed either directly or indirectly in the fishery. Unemp loyment in thatcommunity
had dropped from just over 900/. to jus t over 7/)'t1o;a significant decrease ("Statement",
2001) .
By October, 200 1, the federa l government had actually signed 24 agre ements under the
longer term respon se to the Marshall decis ion, announced in February , 200 1. Agreements
in principle had been reached with five other First Nation co mmunities ("Statem ent",
2001). Each agreement is negotiated independently and is based on the size, needs and
specific requi rements of each aboriginal community . Both the interim agreements that
expired on March 31, 200 1 and the long-term agreements provided aboriginal
communities with access to fishing licences and gear. Some First Nation communities
also negotiated funding in their agreements for diversification from traditional fishing.
For example, the deal signed with the Red Bank First Nation on Apri l 20, 2000 provided
the commun ity with 3 licences each for smelt and eel. More important ly though was the
almost $3 million contribution for a lodge, boardwalk and trails, and hospitality training,
plus guide and safety training in support of the development of an ceo-tourism industry
(Atlan tic Policy Congress of First Nations Secre tariat Inc., 200 18). Another examp le of
diversificatio n is the Waycobah First Nation. In this case the governm ent provided $1.9
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million; part of'whieh was used to set up a fishery retail outlet (Atlantic Policy Congress
of First Nations Secretariat lnc., 200lb) . This outlet is creating both jobs and income for
the community (Statement, 2001).
4 3 2 Education and Training
Aboriginal people have been afforded the opportunity to participate and be educated and
trained in new fishing technologies and practices. This is another positive impact
resulting from the changes that have been made in fisheries policy as a result of the
Marshall Decision. With the advances in technology in the fishing industry, access in the
form of licences and boats was insufficient to ensure that aboriginal communities were
able to become active and efficient participants in the fishery. Access to fishing licences
and gear is of hnle use if the people or group in possession of the licences do not have the
knowledge to utilize them . For this reason, agreements with the aboriginal communities
also included provisions for capacity-building. While this includes money for harbour
and resource management, and wharf and infrastructuredevelopment, it also covers such
items as training in navigation, seamanship and sustainable fishing ("Backgrounder",
2001). Initially, the resources required to provide this training were not readily available
within the communities. This was the logic behind the formation of the Technical
Working Group for First Nations Fisheries Training.
The Technical Working Group for First Nations Fisheries Training was fonned shortly
following the Marshall Decision. Its members include researchers, educators. government
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personnel and aboriginal fishers . The mandate of this group was to engage aboriginals in
the design. development and delivery of courses that wou ld he lp them learn to become
responsib le and efficient fishers . They co uld then pass that knowledge on to the other
members ofthcir commun ities while keeping in mind their unique community
requirements ("Eigh!", 2001) . One initiat ive of the group was the Mentor Certi fication
Pilot Program . On October 26, 2001, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and the
Executive Director of the Atlantic Policy Congress of First Nation Chiefs , jo intly
anno unced that eight candidates from the aborigina l communities of Pictou Landing.
Afton, Chapel Island, and Membertou, Nova Scotia and Abegweit , Prince Edward Island
had successfully graduated from this three-week co urse. The candidates chosen were
experienced fishers from within the communities. They received one week of classroo m
traini ng from instructors at both the Coady Intemational lnstit ute and the Nova Scot ia
Community College School of Fisheries together with elders from the aboriginal
communities who provided advice on the cu ltural and traditional aspects oCthe
instruction. This was followed by two weeks oC"on the job training" where the
candi dates provided mento ring to 24 potential crewmembers from the communi ties using
their newly acquired teaching skills. This initiative provides a good example of the types
of initiatives needed to develop and build capacity within aboriginal communities
("Ei ght" , zoou,
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4.3) Social lmpaclS
The Miramichi Bay Community Relations Panel was tasked specifically with reviewing
and repo rting on the current state of relations between aboriginal and non- aboriginal
communities in the Mir.unichi Bay area("D haliwal", 2002) . The focus of the subseq uent
report dealt direc tly with the communities in the area, Many of their observ ations abo ut
the social cl imate in the abo rigina l communities (reserves) can be genera lized to the
broader pop ulation o f aboriginals living on reserv es in Atlantic Canada.
Non-aboriginal Canadians have often seen First Nations and their reserves as something
that can only surv ive thro ugh hand-ou ts and govern ment support. Over the yean>, this has
beco me a self fulfilling prophecy. The First Nations of Atlantic Canada have become a
peo ple with nothing to loose . Thi s has beenspawned by 8 lack o f selfrespect andself
worth, idleness anddespai r. As a result of thesefeeli ngs, there is an increase in the
incidence of ill-adapted and self-destructive behaviours. In such enviro nments, a high
priorit y is not placed on education. For exampl e, the Panel prov ided a demographi c
pro file of the Burnt Church Mi'kmaq community and compared it with that of a nearb y
non-abo riginal senlement. In the Burnt Church comm unity, only 5% of the populat ion
hadgrad uated from high schoo l and only 2.60/. had graduated from universi ty. In the
neighbou ring non-aboriginal community, 11% of the pop ulatio n had obtained a high
school diploma and 8.6% had undergraduate university de grees or higher (Au gustine &
Richard, 2002).
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In the wake of the Marshall Decision, more and more aborigina l peop le have found
employm ent and received training. The positiv e impact of educa tion and employment go
beyond providing a means of earning a living. With these changes have come changes in
attitude. A participant in the Mentor Certification Pilot Program and member of the
Memberto u First Nation commented that:
The past three weeks showed us, as mentors, that there is a lot of
experienc e and know ledge in our communiti es. We are able to tra in our
own peop le and to have the success and confidence to do so withou t
hesitatio n. ("Eight", 200 1).
The Minister of Fisheries and Oceans stated in his press release on October 23, 2001, that
"Millbrook First Nation has a new fishing vessel, a new wharf, and a new degree of
optimis m." ("S tatement", 2001). The Marsha ll Decision has provided a renewed sense of
hope. Employm ent and the possibilit y of providing a "moderate livelihood " for ones
family has given aborigi nal peop les a sense of self worth , pride and purpose . With this
comes a renewed sense of pride in ones history and heritage.
4.3.4 The Case of Bum t Church (and other aborigina l communiti es who have refused to
sign dealsl
As interim deals between the federal governme nt and aboriginal communities expired on
March 31, 200 1, both sides worked diligently towards an agreement on the temp late for
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the wo rding of longe r term agreem ents . First Nations Chiefs engaged the advice of their
lawyers to ensure that any agreements that they signed now wo uld not haunt them or
affect their newly recogni zed treaty right to fish . Specifically, the Atlantic Policy
Congress of First Nations Chiefs wanted 10ensure that any dea l signe d with the Federal
govern ment would not define, re linquish or extinguish aborig inal treaty rights ("Ottawa",
200 1). Yet, eve n with these assu rances only 30 ofthe 34 First Nations were expec ted to
sign deals ("Ottawa", 2001) .
One of the groups not expected to sign a dea l with the Federal Government was the Burnt
Church First Nation. Burnt Church has been in the spot light since the Marsha ll Decision
came down in September of 1999. One of the reaso ns Bumt Church gained such
notoriety was that it was one ofthe few First Nations communi ties located on the water.
Most reserves in Atlant ic Canada were created on land no one wanted.. For that reaso n,
most are land locked.. Burnt Church had access to the resource and was exercising their
treaty right prior to the Marshall Decision (Bamsley, 2001) . Violent clashes amon g
abori ginals, non -aborigina ls, fishery offic ers and the RCMP have made the head lines in
newspapers, television shows and the international arena. Since the rulin g, the Burnt
Church community has refused. to accep t the authority of the Federal Governmen t to
regulate their treat y rights, for any reason .
With other abo riginal communities receiv ing extensive fund ing in the fonn of fishing
licences, boats, gear , training and other resources, it is hard to understand why a few
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communities, including Burnt Church have refused to sign deals with the federa l
governm ent. Some bel ieve that the agreeme nts offered by the Departm ent of Fisherie s
and Oceans only amount to a different face on the same old welfare check. The only
requireme nt to get this check is that you must sign an agreem ent with the Department of
Fisheries and Oceans . Thus, instead of being offered a treaty-based fishery, you have a
delegated authority (Bear, 2001). Others voiced concerns that any deals signed with
Ottawa now would be used to limit aborigina l rights in the future ("Nova Scotia", 200t ).
The Miramichi Bay Community Relations Pane l had several meetings with different
individuals from within the Burnt Church community in the hopes of being able to
recommend a suitable action plan that would help ease tensions between the aboriginal
and non-aboriginal communities in the area. There were many opinions voiced by
different members from within the community. Hearsay information indicated that the
motives of those representing the community were questionable. The finances of the
community are currently under third party management and one member of the
community was quoted as saying "Third party manageme nt is a good thing." (Augustine
& Richard , 2002 ). Extremists from within the community believe that Canada as a nation
and as a government has no authority over their lives. Most individuals wished to have an
action plan in place that allowed them to ... .. facilitate the 'S trengthening of their
heritage .'" (Aug ustine & Richard, 2002). To the pane l thai was asked 10 listen to the
peop les of the Miram ichi Bay area. this means allowing the people of the aboriginal
oommunity to live with self-respect, pride and self-rel iance. Thc overa ll theme that ran
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through these discussion s was that the members " . .want consultation, not imposition"
(Augustine & Richard, 2002) .
The general feeling among aboriginals of the Burnt Church community is that
consultation is unlikely to happen. A recent article in The Te legram, on Saturday , March
2, 2002, began with
"A New Brunswick reserve has been backed into a comer by the federal
government into discussing a deal that could end the yearly round of
violence in the Miramichi fishing ground."
In the same article , an activist and fisher from Burnt Church has been quoted as saying,
"What are we going to do? Wait until Indian Affairs starts distribut ing
food to our people ? .. .We've got some of our people in jail. Our boats
have been seized and we have no gear."
The opinion put forward in the article was that the federal government was slowly using
all the powers withi n their means to force the Burnt Church community to sign a deal.
Consultation did not appear to be an option . It is unfortunate that at a time whcn many
First Nations see hope, promise and prosperit y, others fail to recogni ze the opportuni ties
that lie before them.
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4.4 Tribal irIdian Treaty Rights j n the United States
Canada is not unique in its strugg les with the issues of aboriginal access to co mmercial
fisheries. Durin g the late 1960 's and the 1970's Indian tribes in the Paci fic Northw est and
the Great Lakes regio n began success fully exertin g their treaty right to fish in areas ofT
thei r rese rvat ions (Goodman. 2000 ). In Washington State, the state gov ernment had
imposed take and season restrict ions that permitted on ly spo rt fishin g in the Co lumb ia
River Basin area . As a result of these regulations, the tribes in the Pacific Northwes t were:
prevented from exercising their treaty right to fish. The case o f United States v,
Washin gton in the 1970' s was launched in response to this problem . Jud ge George Boldt,
in the now famo us Boldt Decision, ruled that Wash ingto n State 's regu latory scheme was
discri minatory against tribal fishing (Goodman . 2000 ; Perron . 200 1). He also ruled that
natives would receive 50-Ii o f the total fish harvest. Further . in a later case of Was hington
v. Washington State Co mmercial Fishing Vesse l Ass' n, the jud ge there ruled that the
treaty rights of the natives to the natural resource should be sufficien t to provide the
tribes with a modera te liveli hood . Finally, in Phase II o f Un ited Stat es v. Washington.
Judge Orrick ruled thai the tribes ' treaty allocations includ ed both wild fish and hatch ery
fish populat ions (Perron , 200 1).
The Boldt decision was challenged by the state of Was hingto n and its citizens . The
argumen t was that Boldt' s allocation of resources to the tribes was unco nstitutiona l and
discriminated against non-Indian fishenn an (Perro n. 200 1). In the end. the Supreme
Court affirmed the Boldt deci sion. The negot iated treaty right cou ld not be regu lated by
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state government regu lations andit found that the negotiated rights to the natura l resou rce
were such as to provide the tribe with a moderate living (Perron, 200 1).
Since the Marshall decision, many similar arguments have been made by non-aboriginal!
in Atlantic Canada. As happened in the United States. the court did not back down on its
decision. In Canada, a clari fication was issued in Marsha ll No.2, but ultimately, the
Department of Fisheries and Oceans had to provide access to commercial fisheries foe
aboriginal peoples. In both situations, native peoples signed treat ies with European
settlers that ensured that native pcople would continue to have access and rights to fish
commercially. In the American treaties, this was more clearl y laid out than in Canad a, but
the result is the same . Access to commercial fishing had to beprovided to native peoples.
Indian tribes in the Pacific Northwest place a great importance on the fishery . Exercising
the tribes ' treary right to the fishery is a mainsta y of the economy andfishing for both
commercial and subsistence use is pan of the tribes ' unique identity. They also see the
fishing activity as a way to pass their culture and heritage through the generations
(Goodman, 2000). The reasons given explaining the importance of fishing to the tribes in
the United States are the same explanations and arguments expressed by aboriginals in
Atlantic Canada as to why they feel that fishing is an important part of their heritage.
Similar circumstances 10 the Pacific Northwest situa tion also occurred in other states as
well. Generall y, the allocation of 50% of the allowable harvest has been the standard
46
since the Boldt decision (Treaty Rights, 2001) . Howeve r, the court decisio ns themselves
are not as important as the actions that resulted in response to the court decisions . Since
that time , steps have been taken that have resulted in Indian tribes in the United States
taking a very act ive role in fisheries management. Many tribes have comprehensive
natura l resouree departme nts employi ng a range of experts in vario us fields associated
with resource manageme nt (Goodman, 2(00).Tribes were required to put in place the
necessary tools to effectively regu late their fishery. They had to have a fisheries biologist
on staff that cou ld help with the writing of appropriate regu lations and monitor the
fishery. They also had to ensure that they could enforce their fisheries regulations and
prosecute any offenders (Tough quest ions, 1977).
Many of the court cases invo lving the execut ion of treaty based fisheries in the United
States OCCUlTed over 20 years ago. Today, more that two decades after the Boldt
Decision, a coopera tive approach to natural resource managem ent has evolved among
tribal governmen ts, agencies , industry and the general publi c in the state of Wash ington.
These groups are currentl y working together to deve lop an effective salmo n enhancement
project that wou ld benefit all concerned parties (Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission,
2(0 2). The tribes in the Washington state area have also joincd forces. In 1974 they
formed the Northwes t Indian Fisheries Commission (Nort hwest Indian Fisheries
Commission , 2(0 2). This group provides the Indian tribes a united voice on fisheries
management policy and activities. Within the organization, there are various divisions
and program s that provide administrative support, technical information, support and
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planning assistanc e in such areas as harvest management, database management. fish
health. habitat management and protection and public information and education services
(Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission. 2002) . Thesesystems and programs provide
useful models on which to build the fisheries policy and management strategi es for
Atlantic Canada . Fisheries policy in Atlantic Canada is at a similar point in its
development as the pol icies of Washington State were when the Boldt decision was
brought down in the 1970s. The federal government can study this case and those of other
countries who have experienced similar situations. By studying similar cases in other
countries we, as a nation, can learn from the success and the failures of others. By
applying these principles to our own situation, we have the too ls to formulate an even
better and more effective fisheries policy for Atlant ic Canada.
4.5 Beyond the Manho.lf Decision
The Marshall Decision has brought a renewed recognition of aborigina l problem s and
issues. Without this court challenge and judgement it is unlikely that aborigina ls in
Atlantic Canada would have had the same opportunity to participate in the commercia l
fishery as they do today. There also appears to be a greate r willingness in the federa l
government to build working relationship with aborigina l communities through
negotiations rather than be forced to react to court litigated decisions.
Since the Marshall Decis ion there have been various exam ples of this new comm itment.
For exam ple, on February 9, 2001, the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
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Develop ment announced the appointment of a Chief Federal Negotiator to begin the
process ofrcaching an agreement in the determination of the "scope and nature of the
Mi'kmaq rights to land, resources and self-government" in Nova Scotia ("Statement by
Robert Nault", 200 1). Exploratory talks are also expec ted to begin in New Brunswick,
Prince Edward Island and Quebec . On Friday, April 12, 2002. CBC News Online
reported that the Federal Governm ent would sponsor a six-month study to review
complaints by aborig inal peoples in Newfoundland who claim they have been denied
recognition under the Indian Act since Newfoundland joined confederation.
Another interesting example lies within the Conne River Mi'kmaq Band, located in
south-centra l Newfoundland. The COMe River Band is currently in the co urts in an
attemp t to gain recognition under the Marshall Decision. Thei r fight has been suppo rted
by a resolution tabled at the All Chiefs Fonun of the Atlantic Policy Congress of First
Nation Chiefs and Secretariat held on March 27 and 28, 2002 (Atlant ic Pol icy Congress
of First Nations Secretariat Inc., 2002). The federal governmen t believes that the Peace
and Friendshi p Treaties o f 1760-6 1do not apply to the Mi 'kmaq residing in
Newfoundland.
Since 1994, there hasbeen an allocation transfer program under the Aborig inal Fisheries
Strategy. This program, which was the government 's response to the Sparrow Decision,
helps facilitate the transfer o f commercial fishing licences to aboriginal commun ities. As
of May, 200 1, the Conne River Band in Newfoundland has gained control of and oper ates
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four commercial fishing licences. Although the Allocation Transfer Progra m had existed
since 1994, a Fisheries Department staff officer for aboriginal fisherie s in the
Newfoundland Region indicated that it was "not until the last year that the need of the
Conne River Band was identified" (" Newfoundland", 200 1).
While it is probab le that any of the events listed above would have occurred without the
Marshall Decision, it is highly improbable that they would have received such immedi ate
and timely action. Following the Marsha ll Decision, the Minister of Indian and Northern
Affairs met with Mi'kmaq and Malecite chiefs to assess and address the standard of
living in their communitie s, and discuss the importance of economi c developm ent and the
impact oflimited space on aboriginal communities social requ irements. These items have
been issues for many years. Would these items have been addressed in the year 2000 if
the court had not handed down the same ruling in the Marshall Deci sion? One can only
speculate about this point, but it does give cause for consideration. Whether or not the
Marshall Decision has caused Ottawa to take action, a change can be seen in the federal
government's approach . The Minister for Indian and Northern Affairs stated that :
I strongly believe that it is our respon sibilily - not the role of the co urts- to
define the relationship between Aboriginal peopl e, governm ents and
Canadian s in general. . . .J sincerely believe that it is time for all of us to
try and to reconcile our interests through honourabl e, respectful and good
faith negotiatio ns. ("Sta tement by Robe rt Nault", 2001) .
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The question ofwhelher or not treaty rights will be extended to other natural resources
such as logging, mining. oil and natural gas are still issues that need to be addressed. As
negotiations between aboriginal communities in Atlantic Canada, the federa l and
provincia l governments continue, there is no doubt that these items will be brought to the
table and become a part of the long-term govern ment response under the Departm ent of
Indian and Northern Affairs to both aboriginal and treaty rights. As the economic base of
the aboriginal communities gains strength and soc ial cond itions improve it is natural for
these groups to evolve and become partners in the explo itation , use and benefits of
Canada 's other natural resources . Their culture, customs, heritage and way oflife is
important to them. It is clear that the aborigi nal commun ities wish to regain their self-
respect, pride and self-reliance. Government should consider using aboriginal views in
the management plans for our natural resources instead of ignoring their traditiona l
know ledge and wisdom. Such actions will help Canada grow as a nation.
5.0 Concluding Remarks
How important to aboriginal issues is the Marsha ll Decision of 1999? Any answer to this
question wou ld be based on the subjectivi ty and the op inions of the person answering it.
It is more important to consider the facts. Huge changes have been made in the federal
government 's fishery polic y as a result of the Marsha ll Decision . These changes have the
potentia l to continue beyond the fishery into other public policy issues. Governmen t is
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propos ing and initiating discussions on numerous issues that are important to aborigina ls
in Atlantic Canada. By being proacti ve in their approach, the governme nt has a greater
chance of avoid ing the chaos and confusio n that was seen as a result of the Marshal l
Decision.
When considering the Marshall Decision, we can not forget the impact it has had on non-
aborigi nal communities . Initial figures of earning for aboriginals and non-aboriginals in
the Miramichi Bay area were compared in the report released in March 2002 . When
figures were corrected using a Purchasi ng Power Parity adjustment factor, it was found
that there was little difference in the income of peoples in rura l fishing communities and
the aboriginal communit ies (Augustine & Richard , 2002) . This tells us that any change
that affects the ability of any membe rs of these small communities to earn a living has the
potential to cause significant negativ e impac ts. Out migration , especiall y among the
commun ities ' youth, the closure of small business and possibly the death of some small
communities are probable outcomes of the changes in the government's fisheries policy.
Many of the affected individuals wi ll not receive any compensation . Their plight has not
been considered as the government rushes to abide by the Supreme Court ' s rulings .
Aboriginal comm unities will benefit from the Marshall Decisio n. The y now have access
to fishing licences, boats and gear that many didn 't have before. Other aborig inal
comm unities have been supplied with the resources that have allowed them to divers ify
into other related and lucrative industries. Train ing that incorporates traditional values
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and beliefs are being offe red. In addition.,aboriginal peoples are learni ng the skills to
train themselves. 11also appears thai since the Marsha ll Decis ion, the governm ent has
become more attentive to the social problems that haunt many aboriginal communities .
Self-respect, pride and sel f-reliance are becomin g realities for aboriginal peop les.
As fisheries policy in Atlantic Canada evolves, there are still a number of problems and
issues that need to be addressed . Training. relocation ass istance and counselli ng for
displaced non-abori ginal crew members should be provided. The government has set a
precedent when changes in government policy have resulted in fishers losing their jobs.
The displaced crew members should expect no less. In addition, all fishers, both
aborigina l and non-aboriginal need to keep pace with the increas ing sophisticat ion of the
fishing industry. Mentoring is an effective way to train newfishers in industry practices
using the too ls of their culture to effectively communicate the ideas. long-term train ing
opportunities still need to be available to all groups to ensure that licence holden and
crew members are knowledgeable in the latest techno logy in the areas of safe ty.
seamansh ip and production o f a quality product.
The federa l governmen t needs to encourage increased consultation among itse lf.
abori gina l fishers and non-aboriginal fishers . Coopera tion amon g the stakeholders will
build a better understandin g o f all of the issues and greater support for the resu lting
fisheries policy. Participation. knowledge and understanding of fisheries policy decisions
may also bring greater compliance with the regulations and acceptan ce of the decisions
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among the groups involved in the fishing industry. The federal government also needs to
stud y the situat ions and experiences of other countries tha t were faced with simil ar
problems and learn through their successes and their mistakes .
All ofthe d iscussi on to date has been based on the idea that there will be sufficient
resou rces to provide a modera te livel ihood to abo rigina l grou ps. As the gov ernment
moves forward with changes in its fisheri es pol icy and the final report is released on the
Atlantic Fisheries Policy Review, we have to wonder what will hap pen if the fish stock s
that are sustaining fishennen today also collap se. Once aga in, similari ties can be dra wn
between the Marshall Dec is ion today and the Boldt Deci sion in the Unit ed State s. Tod ay,
tribes a ffected by the Boldt dec ision are suffering due to the con tinuing degrad ation o f
fish hab itat as salmon stocks in the Pacifi c Northwest cont inue to dec line and ap proach
extinction. Mon ey damages are bei ng so ught by tribes and many tribes are prepari ng for
litigat ion to recover their losses . The ultimate wish is that the fish and thei r habitat are
restored but if that can not happen. the tribes want to be compensated for the ir losses
{Perron, 2001). Wh ile abori ginal s in Atlantic Canada view increased access to the fishery
as a means to build self-esteem and foster prid e in one's se lfand one 's heri tage, the
nat ives of the Pac ific Northwest in the Uni ted States view a resto red fishe ry in the same
ligh t. In Atlantic Canada we must wonder what wou ld be the act ion of aboriginals if there
are insu fficien t fisheries resourc es to allow for them to earn a modera te livelihood . If
natural fish stocks do dec line below sustainable leve ls and aborig ina ls can no longer eam
a moderat e liveli hood from trad itiona l fish stocks, will there be legislation that allows
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aborigina ls preferred access to the most desirab le aquaculture sites? These are all
ques tions to think about and consider as the governme nt charts its course towards its new
long-term Atlantic Fisheries Policy.
The judge in the Supreme Court of Canada case ofDelgamuukw in 1997 made a very
important statement; "We are all here to stay!" Yes, it is true that aborig ina ls have
suffered greatly at the hands of European settlers, the British Crown and later the
Canadian govcmment. Treaty and aborigina l rights need to recognized and respected. as
do the aborigina ls peop les and groups that these treaties and rights represent . At the same
time, as a country, we still need one governing body that is responsible and accountable
to all Canadians. With that in mind, it is important to look forward to solutions rather
than to dwell in the hurts and wrongs of the past. Cons ultation with all parties ,
aborigina ls and non-abo riginals is an important part of the process. Negotiat ion, not
litigation is the key.
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